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Abstract
The main motivation of this paper is to study the impact of the composition of creditors on
the probability of default and the risk premium on sovereign bonds, when there is debtor moral
hazard. In the absence of any legal enforcement, relational contracts work only when there are
creditors who have a repeated relationship with the borrower. We show that ownership structures
with a larger fraction of long term lenders are associated with a lower default probability and
lower risk premia. Moreover, competitive markets structures lead to loss in efficiency as well
when there is moral hazard, in contrast to the case with perfect enforceability and information.
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1 Introduction
In recent years countries have turned increasingly from bank loans to bond issues to raise capital. As a
result, the international capital markets are more diversified and function more efficiently. Specifically,
there is a broader investor base available to provide financing for emerging market sovereigns, which
has helped diversify risk. But there is a serious downside if a country faces unsustainable debt. Private
creditors have become increasingly numerous, anonymous and difficult to coordinate. (IMF, 2003)
During the 1980s, lending in sovereign debt markets was very different from what it is now:
there were syndicated bank loans and a small number of banks which operated on a common set of
assumptions that tended to avoid legal action. In contrast, Brady bonds and subsequent new debt
issues in the 90s were purchased by thousands of new investors, including institutional hedge funds –
see Figure 1 Wright (2005). This greater diversity among creditors meant that they were less likely
to be constrained by tacit understandings about a shared collective interest.
This stylized fact has great relevance for sovereign debt markets. As Wright (2005) suggests the
changing nature of such markets might be good in terms of increased competition for lending from
the point of view of the debtor country when debt is enforceable, but the case of sovereign debt
is vastly different. When debt cannot be contractually enforced in the debtor country but not the
creditor countries, then creditors who can co-ordinate punishments may achieve much better outcomes
in terms of default incentives than un-coordinated creditors. So competition in such markets is not
necessarily always good.
Co-ordination problems can arise at various levels: e.g. at the level of the contracts that are signed:
how favourable they are to creditors, at the level of punishment in case of default and at the level of
the re-negotiation of debt in case of partial default.
For example, let us examine the events after the Argentine default of 2001. The ex-post default
evidence on bond issues has been studied by e.g. Dhillon, Garc´ıa-Fronti, Ghosal, and Miller (2006) and
Sgard (2005). It reveals an interesting pattern of creditor composition post default: a large number
of small creditors (more than 1/4 million) and a few very big lenders. This creditor heterogeneity
has been cited as one of the causes for delay in the post default renegotiation. The coordination
problem was resolved just before the 2005 swap: a significant fraction of the small lenders sold their
bonds cheap to big lenders allowing them to start bargaining with Argentina. In general, besides
re-negotiation of debt, large creditors can have co-ordinating effects on the market for sovereign debt.
This is what we try to capture in our model.
In this paper we study the question of how the composition of debt, in particular, the presence of
large creditors who have a repeated relationship with the debtor affects (ex-ante) the probability of
default and the risk premium on bonds.
Our formal model is a stochastic dynamic game where there is a fraction of ”large” lenders and a
fraction of ”small” lenders all of whom buy one period bonds from the borrower country. The only
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difference between the two types of lenders is that large borrowers internalize the effects of their own
actions on the rate of interest and on the probability of default, and have access to a commitment
technology for delivering on promises next period while small lenders do not. Small lenders always
offer to buy bonds at any rate of interest higher than the risk free rate. Large lenders however have
bargaining power in setting the rate of interest while small lenders take it as given and only decide
whether to buy bonds or not. The borrower country chooses the level of effort (or investment): the
higher the effort the higher the probability of a good outcome. In case there is a bad outcome, the
country must default on it’s debt. In this setting, the optimal contract for the borrower country
must take into account two incentive problems: moral hazard and repudiation of debt servicing in the
good state and the participation constraint of the country as well. Large lenders choose their profit
maximizing rate of interest subject to the presence of small creditors, and the incentive compatibility
conditions. Hence small lenders exert a negative externality on large lenders through the lowering
of the rate of interest as well as through the free riding on providing incentives to repay. There is
an indirect effect on incentives by small lenders: lowering the rate of interest encourages repayment.
The direct effect on incentives is however negative since they free ride on rewarding the borrower for
repayment or punishing for default. We show that the effect of small creditors on the probability of
default is positive: the higher the fraction of bonds held by small creditors, the higher is the probability
of default and the higher are the risk premia. This result has a similar flavor to a phenomenon pointed
out by Hellman and Stiglitz (2000) that banks have tendencies to gamble on investments much more
the higher is the competition they face in the market.
1.1 Related Literature
One of the first questions to understand in the absence of well developed enforcement mechanisms in a
sovereign debt market is: why do countries repay debt?1 One possible explanation is that they repay
because they are worried about sanctions in case of default. There is a literature (Bulow and Rogoff
(1989) Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990)) focusing on direct punishment in the form of sanctions to
the defaulter country. The problem with this interpretation is that due to the nature of the sovereign
debt market, there is no clear evidence of effective sanctions.
A second interpretation argues that countries repay because they are worried about the impact
of a default on their reputation ( Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)). These papers argue that a country‘s
commitment to repay arises through the threat of no future credit in the market. Following a similar
argument, Eaton (1996) describes a model in which there are two types of borrowers. The bad one
always defaults if it is optimal and the good one always try to repay if they can. In any case, at
low levels of debt, bad borrowers have a reputational incentive to repay in order to mimic the good
types. Kletzer and Wright (2000) describe how lending can be sustained in equilibrium, allowing for
1For a detailed description of the issue, please see Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006)
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partial market exclusion in case of default with the creditor extracting all future gains from the debtor.
However, in equilibrium there is no default because in the hypothetical case of default, the equilibrium
in the subgame is just as painful as autarky. The main result is that they have a model where, without
insurance, without sanctions and without international institutions; sovereign debt markets still exist.
The common feature of the reputation models is that the only way that creditors could punish a
country is by denial of future credit. An important assumption of the reputational models is that
creditors are able to fully coordinate on punishments. Wright (2002) describes how the market could
be sustained if lenders collude in the lending condition and punishing in case of default. Finally,
Wright (2005) analyses how the developing country sovereign debt market has became progressively
more competitive and how this harms coordination on punishment among creditors. He describes
how this affects welfare and concludes that reduced competition in the market is welfare improving
when there are enforceability problems . However, while Wright (2005) is concerned more about
self enforcement of contracts, there are no incentive problems stemming from moral hazard in the
investment decision. Moreover, he is concerned with efficiency of the investment decision while we
focus on the probability of default and risk premia. In terms of efficiency, our results are similar. We
show that while competition might be welfare improving in the absence of enforceability and moral
hazard constraints, this does not remain the case when these constraints become important.
A related paper by Kovrijnykh and Szentes (2007) analyzes the effects of default (debt overhang)
on market structure. They show that when debt overhang occurs, then seniority rules imply that only
the incumbent lender is willing to lend to the country and so he exploits his monopoly power. After
a series of good shocks however the lender finds it optimal to allow access to other lenders again. Our
paper, in contrast, looks at how market structure affects the probability of default.
Evidence that supports our results on the importance of creditor coordination is provided in a
paper by Drelichman and Voth (2008) that looks at defaults in the age of Philip II, in the 16th
century. Philip II of Spain accumulated huge debts and defaulted four times but yet was able to get
access to funds. They show that in fact the lenders were a highly coordinated group with the ability
to cut off Philip II’s access to smoothing services. Lending morataria were sustained by a ”cheat the
cheater” strategy as in Kletzer and Wright (2000). We show that when syndicated bank loans give
way to bonds and there is a reduced co-ordination among lenders it makes it more difficult to sustain
lending morataria: this in turn leads to higher defaults and market break-downs.
The paper is organised in two sections. The next section introduces the setup of the model. Section
three analyses Sequential equilibria of the repeated game. Finally, we draw some conclusions.
2 The Model
The model investigates the link between the composition of bond ownership, the probability of default
and the risk spread on the debt. What we have in mind here is that there are some creditors in the
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market who are more ”powerful” in the sense that (a) they internalize the effect of their actions on
the repayment rate and have access to a commitment technology to deliver future loans and (b) they
can influence the interest rate of the bonds even though they are issued by the borrower country.
Formally, we assume that a fraction 1 − α of creditors are ”large” creditors who do influence the
rate of interest and who act strategically. All large creditors are assumed to be identical and own αl
(exogenously given) shares in the total bond issue while small creditors are identical and own αs < αl
(exogenously given) shares of the total bond issue each. Let nl, ns be the numbers of large and small
creditors who own bonds respectively: then α = nsαs and 1−α = nlαl.2 Small creditors are assumed
to be non-strategic: they are willing to buy bonds as long as the bonds pay in expected terms at least
the risk free rate , normalized to 1.
Large creditors use bargaining with the borrower to set the rate of interest. To represent the
outcome of this bargaining game we simply assume a very reduced form where the rate chosen depends
on a weighted sum of the offer by small creditors which we assume to be the risk free rate and the
offer by large creditors Rl. Hence R = αRs + (1 − α)Rl. Large creditors choose Rl to maximize
joint utility. Moreover small creditors have a reservation rate of return equal to 1 (the risk free
rate), and Bertrand competition between the small creditors drives Rs to the point where Rs = 1.
Hence R = (1 − α)Rl + α, so that Rl = 11−α (R − α). Large creditors therefore get a gross return of
RL = (1− α)R so that RL = (1− α)2Rl + α(1− α). Rl is the choice variable for the large lenders.
The sovereign bond market consists of one borrower, large creditors and small creditors. There
are two goods. The borrower country has no endowment of good 1. The sovereign borrows 1 unit of
good 1 in every period to invest in a risky technology which yields the end of period payoffs of YH of
good 2 with probability P and YL = 0 with 1 − P . The probability is assumed to be an increasing
and concave function of the level of effort (or investment measured in units of good 2), e. All agents
are risk neutral. Good 2 is measured in terms of good 1 units.
The time line is given in Figure 2 below. First the debt contract is signed with the borrower
receiving one unit of lending (in good 1) and promising to pay R (in good 2) a period later. Given this
contract and expected future payoffs, the borrower then determines his optimal effort (investment).
Finally, outcomes of the borrower’s investment are realized. Output is not observed by creditors, so
contracts are not state contingent. If high output occurs, the borrower could pay off the debt and
engage in a new round of borrowing; or could default. If the bad state is realized we assume that
YH > R > 0, so that when output is low there is no option but to default and pay nothing when there
is no possibility of legal enforcement. In this case the borrower is excluded from the market forever3.
2We can justify this assumption with the following interpretation: large creditors are able to perfectly co-ordinate
their actions: it is worthwhile for them to do so only if they can cover the fixed costs of coordination by owning a large
enough fraction of bonds.
3We assume this for the moment. As discussed before, lack of coordination can show up either in commitment to
rewards or commitment to punishments but it is not clear that in the case of risk neutrality it makes much difference
to the analysis. We simplify by allowing commitment to play a role only in the commitment to rewards rather than
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If the game is a one shot game then defaulting may be deterred if there is a sufficiently high and
enforceable output penalty imposed by the courts for default . This implies that in the absence of
enforcement the one shot game leads to sure default and anticipating this, no lenders will be willing
to lend. In order to get an equilibrium with positive lending, when there are no other reward or
punishment menchanisms, we therefore need at least some creditors who have a repeated interaction
(commitment to lend in future) with the borrower country. We assume that large creditors have access
to a commitment technology, while small creditors do not. This is captured by introducing a partic-
ipation constraint only for small creditors (which is already taken care of earlier in the computation
of RL).
The extensive form game (2) is the stage game of an infinite horizon repeated game with imperfect
monitoring and we investigate the properties of the sequential equilibria of this game. The effort
is unobservable to creditors, and is costly so the debtor is subject to moral hazard. Large creditors
interact with the borrower repeatedly while small creditors only interact for one period. Large creditors
are able to condition the rewards (through future values of RL) for not defaulting on the full history
of repayment. A summary of the variables is provided in Table 2.
R Full repayment R > 1
e Borrower’ s effort e ≥ 0
P Probability of good state P ′(e) > 0, P ′′(e) < 0, P ′′′(e) < 0
P (0) = 0, P ′(0)→∞
YH Output in the good state YH > R
α Small creditors’ bonds share 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
RF Repayment at risk free rate
β Discount factor for large creditors
punishments.
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In this set up there are two driving forces that are important determinants of the probability
of default: the larger the fraction of small creditors the bigger the externality imposed through the
determination of R (i.e. the lower is the monopoly power of large lenders in setting price) and also
the larger the per capita cost of ensuring repayment and effort incentives: since by definition small
creditors get the returns R per unit, without incurring any of the costs of ensuring repayment. Small
creditors therefore free ride: if the actual R is bigger than 1 (the risk free rate) then they gain by
getting a higher repayment while the presence of large creditors ensure a lower probability of default
since they choose Rl (which affects R) anticipating the effect on the incentive to repay. What is the
combined effect of these two forces? The direct competitive effect on R is to lower it, thus improving
incentives to repay. The indirect effect of high α is to increase the net per capita cost to large lenders
of ensuring repayment by large creditors since they get only (1−α)R of the total repayment but they
provide all the promised rewards in terms of lower Rl for repayment. The competitive effect leads
to falling risk premia but the externalities imposed on incentives leads to increasing risk premia to
compensate large lenders. This is what we show in the next section.
3 Sequential equilibria of the repeated game
This section analyses the sequential equilibrium resulting from repeated interactions between the
borrower, the large creditor and a fringe of small creditors. Given that the borrower’s output is
not observable by the creditor, we look for a non-state-contingent optimal relational contract. By
observing the past payment history of the borrower, the large creditor decides Rl on the current loan.
We first describe the sequential problem facing the large lenders. The state of the economy at time
t is indexed by a state ω ∈ {G,B} where G stands for the good state and B for the bad state. The
state is only observed by the borrower.Notice that we restrict attention to maximum punishment
contracts, so once there is default the game ends. Clearly, the modelling should take account of free
riding on punishment- hence allowing re-negotiation in the model and letting small creditors free ride
on large creditors would have been the best modelling strategy. This would imply that the country
can get back into credit markets even after default, albeit with a higher punishment. The problem
however might become intractable given that we have asymmetric information on effort as well as
enforcement problems. Also both borrower and creditors are risk neutral so using varying rewards for
repayment rather than varying punishment for default might well yield qualitatively similar results.
We also assume that the borrower always defaults in the bad state. The publicly observable history
is the sequence of repayments if there has been no default till time t. (Note that we do not need to
formulate the decision of the borrower once a bad state has occurred). The optimal dynamic contract
is a history dependent sequence of repayments {R(ht)}∞t=1 which maximizes the large lenders’ payoffs.
In the equilibrium we must have the following:
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(1) The borrower’s choose e4 in period t to maximize:
Ut = maxe{P (e)[YH −R(ht) + βUt+1]− e} (1)
having observed the contract R(ht). Observe that the price setting process implies that RL =
(1− α)2Rl + α(1− α). (2) Large lenders then choose the contract to maximize their payoff:
Vt = max{Rl(ht)}
{P (e)[(1− α)2Rl(ht) + βVt+1]− (1− α)2}, (2)
subject to the following constraints:
(i) Borrower’s participation constraint:
Ut(e∗(ht)) ≥ 0 (3)
where the autarky payoff is normalized to 0.
(ii) No Default Constraint (or Self Enforcement constraint) of Borrower in the good state:
YH −R(ht) + βUt+1(R(ht+1)) ≥ YH (4)
(iii) Small creditors’ participation constraint:
Pt(e∗(ht))R(ht) = 1 (5)
where in any period, the relation R = (1−α)Rl+α must hold as well (dropping the time subscript
for notational convenience).
This problem has a recursive formulation, using lifetime utility of the borrower as a state variable,
following Spear and Srivastava (1987). This variable is enough to summarize information about
a borrowers’ default history. We consider the space of contracts where incentive problems can be
partially overcome using memory and future promises. Contracts are restricted to depend only on
publicly observable outcomes, which in this case is just whether there is default or not. We follow
the previous literature (Spear and Srivastava (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1988), Abreu, Pearce and
Stachetti (1990), Phelan and Townsend(1991) among others) in formulating the contracting promise
recursively using a “promised value”. The contracts specify moreover that upon default, the borrower
will be permanently excluded from the future credit market. The contract design problem of the
above setup needs to take into account two basic elements: one is the lack of commitment mechanism
on the part of the borrower i.e. that debt can be repudiated, the other is the private information
concerning the actual realised states. One-sided commitment problem in a similar context has been
studied by Kocherlakota (1996) who looks at self-sustaining insurance contract in a village economy
where villagers face idiosyncratic endowment shocks. There, full insurance is not possible as the
optimal contract has to take into account the lack of commitment on the part of villagers even if their
4There is a one to one mapping between effort and the disutility from effort.
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endowments are public information. Instead, the optimal relational contract derived exhibits history
dependence, where history summarizes all past endowments. Such history dependence is dealt with
in a recursive manner by using a “promised value”.5 A similar problem with asymmetric information
has been investigated by Thomas and Worrall (1988).6
To induce the borrower to repay the loan in the good state,7 the large creditor has to promise more
favorable terms in future loan contracts. Notice that these large creditors are like the ”swiss banks”
in the model of Cole and Kehoe (1995). How does this “promised value” capture history dependence
in our model? Let ht track borrower’s past output realizations up to time t. As the loan contract is
not state contingent, the borrower will default in the bad state. So ht simply counts the number of
times that the borrower has made full repayments (or a string of realizations of good state).
Let δt be the “promised value” (present value of lifetime utility in t) made by the large creditor in
the period t− 1 for the delivery in period t. Given δt, the current period interest rate is determined,
Rt(δt). Conditioned on this interest rate and the future promise δt+1, the borrower decides on the
optimal effort, e∗(Rt, δt+1). The future promise also affects whether the borrower would repay the
loan in the good state. So when period t+1 arrives, δt+1 would be delivered only if there was a good
state in period t. This implies that δt+1 depends on δt and a realisation of YH at t, δt+1 = f(δt, YH).
Iterating this relationship forward from the initial δ implies that δt+1 depends on ht. In what follows,
we denote δ the promise made by the large creditor in the last period, and δ′ the promise made in the
current period. In the optimisation faced by the large creditor, δ serves as a state variable.
We want to focus on the trade off between the competitive effect of having more creditors in
the game (captured by a higher fraction of small creditors) and the free riding on the provision of
reputational incentives for repayment to the borrower. We solve now for the dynamic optimal contract
among those with maximum punishment for this problem with one sided commitment. Before that
we analyse the effect of market structure on efficiency.
Observe that as in Wright (2005), absent any enforcement and information problems, a competitive
market structure leads to higher efficiency (i.e. higher e∗ ) than a collusive or co-ordinated market
structure. In our model, competition increases as α increases. Hence, we first show (after introducing
the maximization problem for the large creditors below) that in the absence of the incentive constraints
and full enforceability and observability of effort, higher α leads to higher effort.
Let us first focus on the borrowers optimization problem. Let x = βδ′ − R. Given the contract
(R, δ′) the borrower chooses optimal effort to maximize:
u(e;R, δ′) ≡ P (e)(YH + x)− e (6)
where we assume that the discount factor of the borrower, β is identical to that of the large creditor,
5For other applications using “promised value” approach, see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, Chapters 15 and 16).
6Atkeson (1991) looked at a problem of lending to a sovereign in the absence of complete information and enforcement,
where distribution of future states depends on investment.
7Note that our setup implies that the borrower always defaults in the bad state.
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and the probability of the good state, P (e), is increasing and concave in effort, e. In addition, we
assume that P ′′′(e) < 0, P (0) = 0, P ′(0) → ∞, P (∞) = 1 and P ′(∞) = 0. This yields the following
first order condition of the borrower:
P ′(e) =
1
YH + x
(7)
We define e∗ as the optimal effort:
e∗(x) = argmax
e
u(e;x). (8)
Hence the participation constraint of the borrower becomes:
u(e∗;x) ≡ P (e∗)(YH + x)− e∗(x) ≥ 0. (9)
In addition, for the borrower to have incentive to make full repayment in the good state, he needs
to be “rewarded” when honouring the current contract. This is reflected in the following “no-default”
constraint
YH + x ≥ YH . (10)
This constraint says that conditional on the good state, the borrower will prefer to honour the contract
than to default. Clearly it is equivalent to asking βδ′ − R ≥ 0: this is asking that the continuation
value of the future relationship is large enough that the borrower prefers to pay whenever the good
state is realized rather than default and terminate the relationship. Notice that the participation
constraint for the borrower must be satisfied in every period so that we have δ′ ≥ 0.
In the following we assume first that only one type of bond contract can be written for all creditors.
The bonds are one period contracts. Large creditors are players who are committed to re-lending in
every subsequent period conditional on no default. We also assume that large creditors are fully
coordinated: they decide both Rl and δ′ as a group. In the absence of this assumption, there would
be free riding even among large creditors leading to suboptimal contracts.Solving now for the optimal
contract of large lenders: Let V (δ) be the maximum expected present value to the large creditor
conditional on the state δ. Then V (δ) at any given time must satisfy the following Bellman equation
V (δ) = max
{Rl,δ′}
{P [(1− α)2Rl + βV (δ′)]− (1− α)2}, (11)
where 0 < β < 1 is the large creditor’s discount factor, δ′ denote the current period interest rate
and promise respectively, and P is the probability of good state. Equation (11) simply specifies V (δ)
as the expected payoffs under the optimal contract. If the good state is realized, the large creditor
receives (1− α) fraction of the full repayment and the discounted continuation value associated with
the future relationship. In the bad state, the borrower defaults, creditors obtain nothing and the
relationship is terminated. Since the promise made by the large creditor is on the total amount of
lending, while the return is only on (1−α), small creditors will free ride on borrower’s full repayment
in good state. Moreover, notice that the presence of small lenders depresses the repayment R as well.
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As δ reflect the “transfer” from the large creditor to the borrower, we must have V ′(δ) < 0. We show
this later.
Given that the large creditor is engaged in current period lending, the assumption that creditors
are committed to paying their “promised value” made in the previous period, δ, implies the following
constraint:
u(e∗;x) ≡ P (e∗)(YH + x)− e∗(x) ≥ δ, (12)
where YH is output realised in the good state respectively, and e∗ is the optimal effort chosen by
the borrower. Equation (12) is the so-called “promise-keeping” constraint on the part of the large
creditor. It is clear that δ is measured in terms of borrower’s utility. The promise keeping constraint
reflects the set of (R, δ′) that are consistent with the borrowers participation constraint, given that
lenders are committed to honoring their promise. If this is violated the borrower prefers not to accept
the contract and then get its reservation value δ.
This maximization is done subject to the No repudiation constraint of the borrower (10) and the
participation constraint (12).
Finally the contract must also satisfy the participation constraints of large and small creditors.
Note that the rationality condition of the borrower requires δ ≥ 0. The rationality condition of the
large creditor, V (δ) ≥ 0, implies δ ≤ δmax as V (δ) is decreasing in δ. So the domain of the value
function we consider will be in δ ∈ [0, δmax]. The participation of small creditors is satisfied by
assumption in the definition of R. Generally speaking, the optimal contract of this repeated game
may possess non-stationary equilibrium.
The Appendix shows that the all equilibria in this game are stationary, except for the first period.
Existence of a stationary equilibrium is quite intuitive since the game itself has a stationary structure:
maximum punishment ensures that whenever there is default, all lending is stopped. Since the only
observable variable is the number of defaults, punishment is fixed, and there is no re-negotiation, the
only way that history could matter in through the number of repayments in the past . However, the
initial δ captures history so that the predicted pattern of default would depend on history. Now we
look at the properties of the stationary equilibria.
Proposition 1 Let V (δ) be continuously differentiable, and YH sufficiently large. Then (a) there
exists a unique solution, V (·) to the Bellman equation (11) subject to constraints (10) and (12); (b)
V (δ) is decreasing and concave; and (c) V (·) ≥ 0 .
Proof: Appendix 1.
Proposition 2 Let YH be sufficiently large. Then there exists a unique optimal contract which is
always stationary after the first period.
Proof: Appendix 2.
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Proposition 3 In the stationary optimal contract, ∂R∂α > 0,
∂P
∂α < 0 and
∂e∗
∂α < 0.
Proof: Appendix 3.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is quite simple. Note that from the Bellman equation (11), the
contract has two different effects on the value function. On the one hand, given the probability P ,
the large creditors would like to choose the largest R and smallest δ′ so as to increase its payoff in the
good state. We term this as the collusive (the extreme case is when α = 0 ) effect. This means that
creditors will have incentives to choose the smallest possible x. On the other, the large creditors also
have the incentive to have high P . We term this as the probability increasing effect. This requires high
x. The optimal contract depends which of these two effects dominates. The probability increasing
effect depends on α since the higher is α the greater is the free riding by small creditors on large so
that the participation constraint of large creditors is affected.
When α is large, the presence of the free-riding small creditors will decrease the payoff to the large
creditor in the good state. So the large creditors will have more incentive to decrease x, leading to this
collusive effect dominating the probability increasing effect. In this case, the participation constraint
of the borrower,(9) is binding. From Proposition 3, it is also clear that as α increases, optimal x
decreases. This implies that large fraction of small creditors increase the probability of default but
lead to higher risk premia.
In terms of efficiency Proposition 3 shows that as α increases, the effort decreases. So competition
has a bad effect on incentives to repay when there are moral hazard and enforceability problems. This
conclusion is consistent with Wright (2005).
4 Conclusions
In this paper we presented a stylized model to analyze the effects of creditor composition on the
probability of default by sovereign governments. In the model we assumed that small creditors own a
fixed proportion α of the total bond issue. Small creditors have a direct effect on the price of bonds
through increasing the competition in the market, however they free ride on large creditors by not
taking the impact of their chosen R on the incentives of the borrower to decrease the probability of
default. The net effect according to our model is that increasing competition in the market is bad.
Indeed, an increasing share of small creditors in the bond market increases the probability of default
and increases the risk premium. Our model can explain why a shift from syndicated loans to bonds
might lead to more volatility in the market than before.
Obviously, a lot remains to do. We are interested in endogenizing the entry of large and small
creditors: if there are secondary markets in bonds then small creditors might have incentives to sell to
large creditors so that the ownership structure in the end may be no different from syndicated loans!
Second, we would like to relax the maximum punishment rule we imposed: it would be interesting
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to analyze the case where instead of only rewards to the borrower the lenders can use reductions in
access to the market as punishment. The result of negotiations after default depend on the ownership
structure and that in itself would alter the default rates. We might also consider allowing repayments
to some creditors and not others: an endogenous seniority rule that emerges in response to reputational
concerns.
14
References
Bulow, J., and K. Rogoff (1989): “A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt,” Journal
of Political Economy, 97(1), 155–178.
Cole, H. L., and P. J. Kehoe (1995): “The role of institutions in reputational models of sovereign
Debt ,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 35(1), 45–64.
Dhillon, A., J. Garc´ıa-Fronti, S. Ghosal, and M. Miller (2006): “Debt Restructuring and
Economic Recovery: Analysing the Argentine Swap,” The World Economy, 29(4), 377.
Drelichman, M., and H.-J. Voth (2008): “Lending to the Borrower from Hell: Default in the age
of Philip II, 1556-1598,” Manuscript, University of British Columbia.
Eaton, J. (1996): “Sovereign Debt, Reputation and Credit Terms,” International Journal of Finance
and Economics, 1, 25–35.
Eaton, J., and M. Gersovitz (1981): “Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theory and Estimation,”
Review of Economic Studies, 48(2), 289–309.
Fernandez, R., and R. Rosenthal (1990): “Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations,”
Review of Economic Studies, 57(3), 331–349.
Hellman, Thomas.F.and Murdock, K., and J. Stiglitz (2000): “Liberalization, Moral Hazard
in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?,” American Economic
Review, 90(1), 147–165.
Kletzer, K., and B. Wright (2000): “Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter,” American
Economic Review, 90(3), 621–39.
Kovrijnykh, N., and B. Szentes (2007): “Equilibrium Default Cycles,” Journal of Political
Economy, 115(3), 403–46.
Sgard, J. (2005): “La Dette Argentine et le De´clin du FMI,” Lettre du CEPI.
Sturzenegger, F., and J. Zettelmeyer (2006): “Has the Legal Threat to Sovereign Debt Re-
structuring Become Real?,” Manuscript, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
Wright, M. (2002): “Reputations and Sovereign Debt,” Manuscript, Stanford University.
Wright, M. (2005): “Coordinating Creditors,” American Economic Review, 95(2), 388–392.
15
A Proofs
Appendix 1: Proposition 1
Proof.
We first illustrate that large creditors’ value function and its promised value are bounded from
above so a metric can be defined, we then show there exists a unique value function to the Bellman
equation for some δ subject to constraints (10) and (12). Finally, we show that the value function is
decreasing and concave.
(a) Value function and promised value are bounded from above
Suppose that we can implement some contract to generate the Pareto frontier to the problem, the
combined benefits to all players are given by the following value function
W = max
e
{P (e)YH − e− 1 + P (e)βW} (13)
where W defines the Pareto frontier. Given YH <∞, then
W = max
e
[P (e)YH − e− 1]/[1− P (e)β] ≡ W¯ <∞. (14)
For any allocation of this benefits between creditors and the borrower, we must have V ≤ W¯ . So
for any bounded pair of V , we can define a metric. For the same reason, the borrower’s utility must
also be bounded from above by W¯ . This implies that the promised value by the large creditor must
be bounded from above. Denote the highest promised value by δ¯, then
δ, δ′ ≤ δ¯. (15)
(a) We use Blackwells sufficient condition to show that there exists a unique solution to the Bellman
equation (11).
(1) Monotonicity (for a given δ′)
Define the right hand side of (11) as a function of x and V :
T (V (δ′)) = max
Rl,δ′
{P (e)(1− α)2Rl + P (e)βV (δ′)} − (1− α)2 (16)
subject to constraints (10) and (12), where T is an operator in a metric space. For monotonicity, we
have to show that V˜ ≥ V implies T (V˜ ) ≥ T (V ).
Construct the Lagrangean
L = max
Rl,δ′
{P [(1−α)2Rl+βV (δ′)]−(1−α)2+λ[P (e∗)(YH+x)−e∗(x)−δ]+µx+φ(P [(1−α)Rl+α]−1)}
(17)
where λ, µ are Langrange multipliers. The FOCs to (17) determines Rl and δ′. Using the envelope
theorem
∂L/∂V = ∂T/∂V = βP (e) > 0 (18)
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So T (V ) is monotonic.
(2) Discounting
We have to show that T (V + c) ≤ T (V ) + βc for β ∈ (0, 1). It is straightforward to show that
T (V + c) = maxx{P (x)(1− α)2Rl + P (x)β[V (δ′) + c]} − (1− α)2 (19)
= T (V ) + Pβc ≤ T (V ) + βc
Hence the operator T satisfies monotonicity and discounting, so by Blackwell’s sufficient condition,
V exists and is unique.
(b): Now we prove that the value function is decreasing and concave. Using the envelope theorem
(see (17)) we have: V ′(δ) = ∂L/∂δ = −λ, so V (δ) is decreasing.
Let the iteration of the value function be given by
Vi+1 ≡ T (Vi) = maxRl,δ′{P [(1− α)α+ (1− α)2Rl − 1 + α+ βVi(δ′)] (20)
+λ[P (e∗)(YH + x)− e∗(x)− δ] + µx+ φ(P [(1− α)Rl + α]− 1)}
Assume that V0 is the initial value function and w.l.o.g assume it to be concave. Since P [(1−α)2Rl+
βVi(δ′)] is concave in Rl and δ′, constraints (10), (12) form a convex set of Rl and δ′, so V1 is a
concave function of δ. Through this consecutive iteration process, limi→∞ Vi must converge to a
concave function.
Clearly, V (δ) is a decreasing and concave function in the restricted domain δ ∈ [0, δmax].
(3) V (·) ≥ 0
To show that V (·) ≥ 0, we only have to show that the feasible set used in optimising the RHS of
(17) is not empty. This is sufficient for there to exist a V (·). If there is a solution, then PRl ≥ 1, so
period utility and the value function of the large lender is non-negative.
Note first that the small creditors participation constraint, P (e∗(x))R = 1 generates a decreasing
convex function in (R, x) space, i.e., S = {(R, x) : P (e∗(x))R ≥ 1} is a convex set. Observe that the
LHS of the borrower’s participation constraint (9) is strictly increasing in x, so that the constraint is
equivalent to x ≥ x. So the intersection of these two sets is a non-empty convex set.
It remains to check this intersection is non-empty when we add the constraint (15). The binding
constraint (15) translates into a downward sloping straight line in (R, x) space. The set associated with
constraint (15) is simply a triangle formed by the two axes and the downward sloping line mentioned
above. This set is clearly convex. When YH increases, this set expands. Therefore, there exists a YH
such that the feasible set is convex and non-empty.
Appendix 2: Proposition 2
Proof.
In what follows, we first show the existence of a stationary equilibrium when YH is sufficiently
large. Then we look at the properties of the stationary equilibrium.
17
Given δ, the optimal choice of δ′ is determined by the following FOC:
V ′(δ′) = −(1− α)2. (21)
If such a stationary equilibrium, δ′, exists, then it must be reached in just one period.
Note that without imposing δ ≥ 0 and V (δ) ≥ 0, Proposition 1 ensures that there always exists
some δ′ such that (21) can be satisfied. However, from Proposition 1, the rationality conditions
δ ≥ 0 and V (δ) ≥ 0 imply that the value function is restricted to some domain δ ∈ [0, δmax] where
V (δmax) = 0. To show the existence of the stationary equilibrium δ′, we only need to show that
δ′ ∈ [0, δmax].
From Proposition 1, if YH is large enough, V (·) ≥ 0. Consider the case where δ = 0. Note that the
borrower’s period utility u(e∗;x) = P (e∗)(YH +x)−e∗(x) is increasing in YH , so for large enough YH ,
u(e∗;x) > 0. In this case constraint (10) is binding and (12) is not (for δ = 0). Using the envelope
theorem, it is clear that ∂V (0)/∂δ = 0.
Now, we look at the local behaviour of the value function V (δ) near δmax. Since V (0) > 0, so
V (δmax) = 0 only if V ′(δmax) < 0. From the envelope theorem, this is the case where λ > 0, so
constraint (12) is binding, i.e., P (e∗)(YH + x) − e∗(x) = δmax. Differentiating both sides of the
constraint with respect to δ and incorporating the FOC (7) yields
P (e∗)
∂x∗
∂δ
= 1. (22)
Using the Bellman equation (11) at δmax,
V (δmax) = P (e∗)[(1− α)R∗ + βV (δ′)]− (1− α). (23)
one can differentiate both sides with respect to δ to obtain
∂V (δmax)
∂δ
= P ′(e∗)
∂e∗
∂x
∂x
∂δ
[(1− α)R+ βV (δ′)] + P (e∗)(1− α)∂R
∂δ
+ P (e∗)βV ′(δ′)
∂δ′
∂δ
. (24)
Using x = βδ′ −R we have ∂R∂δ = β ∂δ
′
∂delta − ∂x∂δ . Hence equation (24) can be re-written as:
∂V (δmax)
∂δ
= P ′(e∗)
∂e∗
∂x
∂x
∂δ
[(1− α)R+ βV (δ′)] + P (e∗)(1− α)[β ∂δ
′
∂δ
− ∂x
∂δ
] + β
∂δ′
∂δ
V ′(δ′) (25)
or
∂V (δmax)
∂δ
= P ′(e∗)
∂e∗
∂x
∂x
∂δ
[(1−α)R+βV (δ′)]+P (e∗)β ∂δ
′
∂δ
[(1−α)−(1−α)2]−(1−α)P (e∗)∂x
∂δ
(26)
Noting that P (e∗)∂x∂δ = 1 we get
∂V (δmax)
∂δ
= P ′(e∗)
∂e∗
∂x
∂x
∂δ
[(1− α)R+ βV (δ′)] + P (e∗)β ∂δ
′
∂δ
α(1− α)− (1− α) (27)
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Assume that the future equilibrium δ′ exists and is stationary (which will be validated later), and
let YH be very large so P ′(e∗)→ 0, then
∂V (δmax)
∂δ
= −(1− α) < V ′(δ′) = −(1− α)2. (28)
Since the value function is continuously differentiable and concave, there must be an interior solution
such that V ′(δ′) = −(1− α)2 which is stationary.
Appendix 3: Proposition 3
Before proving this Proposition we need the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Suppose there exists an optimal contract which is stationary. Then in equilibrium, the
participation constraint of borrowers (9) is always binding.
Proof.
By Proposition 2, in a stationary equilibrium we have V ′(δ′) = −(1 − α)2. Moreover by the
Lagrangean equation (17), V ′(δ) = λ. By Stationarity, δ′ = δ so V ′(δ) 6= 0 implies that λ 6= 0. Hence
the constraint (9) is always binding in equilibrium.
Proof. First notice that at equilibrium we have
V ′(δ′) = −(1− α)2. (29)
Hence, by the implicit function theorem we have dδ
′
dα =
2(1−α)
V ′′(δ′) < 0 since V
′′ < 0.
From Lemma (1), we know that the participation constraint of the borrower, (9) is binding, so:
P (e∗)(YH + x)− e∗(x) = δ (30)
By the implicit function theorem:
P ′(e∗)
∂e
∂x
∂x
∂α
(YH + x) + P (e∗)
∂x
∂α
− ∂e
∂x
∂x
∂α
=
∂δ
∂α
(31)
From the first order condition of the borrower, (7 ), we know that P ′(e∗) = 1YH+x . Substituting
this in equation (31) above, we get:
P (e∗)
∂x
∂α
=
∂δ
∂α
(32)
Now, x = βδ −R, in the stationary equilibrium, so again, using the Implicit Function theorem:
∂R
∂α
= β
∂δ
∂α
− ∂x
∂α
(33)
Using equation (32) above, we get:
∂R
∂α
= β
∂δ
∂α
− 1
P
∂δ
∂α
=
βP − 1
P
∂δ
∂α
> 0. (34)
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Consider the first order condition for the borrower equation (7): By the Implicit Function theorem,
we have that
∂e
∂x
= − 1
(YH + x)2
1
P ′′
> 0 (35)
Also by assumption P ′ > 0 so ∂P∂α = P
′ ∂e
∂x
∂x
∂α < 0. Hence, when the constraint (9) is binding then as
α increases, R increases and P decreases.
Finally, ∂e
∗
∂α =
∂e
∂x
∂x
∂α < 0.
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